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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the implications of the philosophical considerations
presented in Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, by examining group formation in a laboratory
setting where subjects engage in both cooperative and conflictual interactions. We endow
participants with a commodity used to generate earnings, plunder others, or protect against
plunder. In our primary treatment, we allow participants to form groups to pool their resources.
We conduct a baseline comparison treatment that does not allow group formation. We find that
allowing subjects to organize themselves into groups does not lead to more cooperation and may
in fact exacerbate tendencies for conflict.
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I. Introduction
We often engage in activity that is detrimental to those around us, finding ourselves in
situations where the individual incentives facing us lead to suboptimal outcomes at the social
level.

Indeed many if not most of these activities occur in a setting where no external

enforcement is available to settle the conflicts that inevitably emerge. One means of protecting
one’s self against violent conflict is to ally with other likeminded individuals. By forming
alliances for a common defense, groups may hope to encourage recalcitrant individuals to cease
activity destructive to the social order. Such tribal behavior is inextricably linked with our
development as a species. When viewed through the critical lens of history, Rousseau’s “noble
savage” is an artificial construct, for man has never existed as an island apart from his peers.
There is much to be said of human achievement through the combined efforts of the
group. A quick read through Joel Mokyr’s narrative history of human invention and creativity
leaves one marveling at the wealth humans have created since classical antiquity (1990). The
grandeur of these achievements is blemished, however, by the equally amazing propensity of
man to wage wars and commit mass genocide. As Matt Ridley succinctly summarizes, “[w]e
may be among the most collaborative social creatures on the planet, but we are also the most
belligerent” (1997, p. 193). It is this tension between cooperation and conflict within the context
of group formation that we examine more closely in this paper. Using the laboratory method, we
conduct a “heuristic experiment”1 to examine, as Hirshleifer (2001) puts it, the manner, form,
and degree to which “[c]ooperation, with a few obvious exceptions, occurs only in the shadow of
conflict” (p. 11).
We draw largely upon the work of Nozick (1974) in developing an interactive framework
in which subjects can pool resources as a group for the purposes of both predation and protection
of endowments of an income-generating asset. Following Nozick, we call these groups
“protective associations.” Relative to the canonical laboratory experiment in economics, we
impose a minimal structure on our participants to examine a variety of complex strategies that
subjects develop to solve the problems they face. Our goal is to observe what institutions, if any,

1

Smith (1982) explains that “[h]euristic or exploratory experiments are used to provide empirical probes of new
topics of inquiry….It is through exploratory probes of new phenomena that attention may be redirected, old belief
systems may be reexamined, and new scientific questions may be asked” (p. 272-273). This is a fitting description of
our motivation for this paper. Using the laboratory method of inquiry, our aim is to shed some light on a question
pertinent to political philosophy and constitutional economics.
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arise endogenously out of a myriad of possibilities to produce a social order within a group of
individuals seeking to attain their own subjective ends.
A critic might ask how we could know whether protective associations historically
developed this way. Clearly, we do not know nor claim to be shedding light on this question.
We have an example and technique to ask a question about how people build social orders.
Wherever, however, or if ever protective associations originated in history, people, from the
Aborigines in Australia to the Sámi people of Lapland, had to create a social system to cope with
conflict. The structure of this social order necessarily reflected the cultural legacies of the tribe
and clearly depended upon the geographic, physical, and economic settings that they faced.
Likewise, in our experiment, subjects must create their own social order within the novel context
in which we place them. To paraphrase Nozick, we learn much by seeing how social order could
have arisen, even if it didn’t arise that way.2

II. Protective Associations
Nozick articulates a theory of how social order could emerge from anarchy through the
formation of protective associations.3 He suggests “Groups of individuals may form mutualprotection associations: all will answer the call of any member for defense or for the enforcement
of his rights…Alliances are designed to allow partners to share risk and resources, gain
knowledge, and obtain access to markets” (p. 12). He poses several dilemmas that could
mitigate the productive efforts of the association. First, protective associations may need to deal
with “cantankerous or paranoid members” along with those who would use the power of the
protective association to violate the rights of others. Second, groups will need to resolve internal
conflict between its own members to avoid “each calling upon his fellow members to come to his
aid”. Third, groups will need to make efficient use of the division of labor and exchange.
Finally, groups must decide on what prices or services to provide for those who may desire more
extensive or elaborate protection (p. 12-13).

2

See Nozick’s similar discussion on the relevance of state-of-nature theory in understanding social processes (p. 79).
3
Protective associations can be translated into a large domain of groups historically. Families, tribes, clans,
cooperatives, corporations and political action committees all take on certain characteristics of protective
associations. For the purposes of this study, protective associations are defined as groups that form as a response to
a dilemma where incentives lead individuals to act counter to the interests of the community as a whole.
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Nozick also recognizes the potential for conflict between groups.

He posits three

potential resolutions to such conflicts. First, members of a losing protective association may try
to join the winning protective association.

Second, the protective associations may use

geographic location to isolate themselves from other groups. Third, rival protective associations
may find themselves equally matched and will come to a tacit agreement not to fight or to
resolve conflicts in a more peaceful manner. Nozick argues that eventually, however, the largest
protective association in a local area will subsume all other protective associations through force
or contract. This “invisible-hand process,” by which spontaneous forces create one overarching
group, emerges because the most efficient group is able to attract new members due to its
superior benefits, and it will “buy-in” outside members into its ranks in order to militate against
further predation against its current members.4
Economists have utilized the notion of protective associations as a thought experiment to
compare the merits of private and public law enforcement.5

As this literature is mostly

peripheral to the purposes of this paper, we mention only a few related points.6 Friedman (1989)
argues that protective associations would bring about a more efficient enforcement of law, and
would prevent conflicts with each other through contract.

Protective associations have a

monetary interest in stability and therefore the protracted costs of conflict outweigh the benefits
of contracting with other associations to avoid this conflict. Friedman, therefore, suggests that a
stable equilibrium should emerge in the long run as the opportunity cost of conflict is too great.
Cowen (1992) argues that the assertion of a stable equilibrium involving a multitude of
protective associations ignores the underlying factors that will instead lead these associations
inexorably to monopoly. He maintains that protective associations would benefit from network
externalities, which would cause a collapse from a multitude of protective associations into
4

A previous commentator of this paper remarked on the similarity between this argument and the Coasian depiction
of the organizational genesis of the firm. Just as firms “buy-in” labor and capital inputs rather than go through
market arrangements, so does the protective association internalize conflicting parties rather than allow such conflict
to play out among decentralized forces.
5
In a highly original piece, Becker & Stigler (1974) argue that bringing more law enforcement into the realm of the
market instead of the public domain would provide enforcers with better incentives to accommodate their respective
clients. While this argument has been criticized (see Landes & Posner 1979; Cowen 1992; and Sutter 1995), several
arguments have been made in defense of protective associations as a viable alternative to the public provision of law
enforcement (Friedman 1989, 1994; Caplan & Stringham 2001).
6
Research on protective associations relates more broadly to the literature examining how and to what extent selfenforcing exchange can achieve social cooperation. This includes research on private law enforcement (Friedman
1989; Benson 1990; Stringham 2007), community and commercial dispute resolution (Ellickson 2005), international
trade (Grief 1993; Leeson 2007a, 2007b, 2008), and property rights in the historical context of the American western
frontier (Anderson and Hill 2004).
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several or even one.

After this collapse, the inefficiencies associated with the group’s

monopolistic hold on protection will arise. In response, Caplan & Stringham (2001) maintain
that associations would have difficulty overcoming the obstacle of collusion that all oligopolies
face. They argue that the incentive to renege and offer services that are more competitive will
overcome the incentive to collude.
Finally, several papers are worth noting from the economic analysis of conflict literature.
These papers emphasize the stability of various forms of “anarchy” given certain conditions (e.g.
Skaperdas 1992; Hirshleifer 1995; and see Durham et. al. 1998, Carter and Anderton 1999,
Duffy and Kim 2005, and Lacomba et. al. working paper for experimental applications of this
research). Drawing on these initial models, a few efforts have incorporated coalition formation
into the analysis. Skaperdas (1998) examines the formation of alliances within conflict. He
finds that coalitions will emerge if there are increasing returns to pooling resources used for
appropriation. Noh (2002) introduces the problem of distribution and collective action within the
alliance. He still finds that alliances are feasible given certain assumptions regarding these intragroup costs and the returns to pooling resources. Esteban and Sakovics (2003) find, however,
that the conditions necessary for a “grand coalition” to emerge are more stringent than the
previous literature indicates. Within the parameters of their model, they find that the costs of
intra-group conflict will outweigh the benefits of inter-group cooperation.

III.

Experimental Design and Procedures

A.

Environment and Institutional Parameters
We draw upon the design and procedures in Powell & Wilson (2008) in building our own

experimental design. We endow six subjects with a number of units of a commodity x that earns
$0.00077 every second that it is designated as an earnings unit e. Prior to receiving this
endowment, each subject takes a short quiz that includes questions drawn from SAT exams. We
utilize the quiz to induce subjects with a sense of entitlement towards their endowments.
Previous experimental work indicates that this procedure does indeed generate a sense of an
earned property right (see e.g. Hoffman and Spitzer, 1982, 1985; Hoffman et al., 1994; and
Cherry et al., 2002). The endowments of x are: 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, and 29 with the subject scoring
highest on a quiz receiving the endowment of 29, second highest 27, and so forth. Ties are
determined by giving the higher allocation of units to the person who finished the quiz first.
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Subjects can convert these initial endowments of x into units of either offense o, defense
d, or hold as e once the experiment begins. Recall that holding one unit in e generates $0.00077
per second. If, for example, a subject with the average endowment of units (24 units) were to
hold her earnings in e for the entire session (assuming no units are taken), then she would earn a
payout of $44.35.7
Subjects may use offensive units to take units of x from another subject, and use
defensive units to protect the subject’s existing units of x. Units placed in defense and offense do
not earn money and cannot be taken. Conceptually this is reasonable as tools used for predation
and protection (firearms, security systems, walls, etc.) are not easily stolen and do not usually
generate income for their owners.8 The opportunity cost is the productive value of holding units
as e. To incorporate a transaction cost, converting units of e into either o or d takes 10 seconds.
During the conversion time the unit does not earn money, and as many units as are available can
be moved at one time.
Subjects can use the units of offense to take e from another subject. The probability that
an attempt to plunder is successful is determined by the number of offensive units (oa) attacker a
has compared to the number of defensive units (dt ) the target t under attack has. Specifically, the
success rate for the attacker is

oa
. After any attempt to take earnings units from other
oa + d t

subjects, offensive units are not available for use for 20 seconds. This additional transaction cost
simulates the recovery costs of using force.
Individual subject holdings of e, o, and d are publicly observable to all participants
throughout the experiment. We notify subjects of all attempts at taking and the result of the
attempts. Individual subject identities remain anonymous at all times.
In what we will call the Nozick treatment, subjects are also able to form subgroups with
other subjects. A subject starts a group by selecting a button “Start Group” and then sending
invitations to other subjects to join. These invitations come in the form of a prompt on the
invited subject’s screen. The invited subject can either accept or reject the invitation. A subject
cannot join—or even be invited—if she or he is currently a member of another group. Only the
founding member of the group can extend invitations. Finally, no member can be removed from
This is calculated as follows: Maximum Median Earnings = 24 units × 40 minutes × 60 seconds × 0.00077 $/sec =
$44.35.
8
Such investments may be categorized as the rent-seeking costs of theft (see Tullock 1967).
7
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a group once she or he joins, though any subset of the group can always leave to form another
group.
Groups have the added ability to pool their respective defensive and offensive
capabilities.

Let G= {1, 2,…, 6} denote the set of all individuals and Gi denote the ith

(nonempty) subset of persons formed by a partition of G. Once a group is formed, members of
the group automatically share all units of defense, i.e., the number of defensive units for each
person in Gi is

∑d
j∈Gi

j

. For example, if a person with oa units of offense attacks a target t

currently part of a group, the probability of success for the attack against t is

oa
as
oa + ∑ d j
j∈Gi

opposed to merely

oa
.
oa + d t

In contrast to the defensive units, which we automatically pool, group members also have
the option of pooling offensive units on a voluntary basis. To pool units of offense, subjects
click on a button above the group member they wish to lend their offensive units. The lender
must send all or none of their units of offense to the designated group member. While the lender
loans these units out, she or he has no ability to take units from any other subject. The reason is
that the person who the lender offers the units to is effectively using the units for that lender. At
any moment, the lender can instantly regain control of their units of offense by clicking the
button above the designated group member a second time. Let Gio denote the subset subjects that
have lent a subject their o. Subjects who borrow o are able to use these units as if they were their

∑o

a

own, meaning the probability of success for attack against target t now becomes

j∈Gio

∑o

a

+ dt

. In

j∈Gio

addition to this change in probability, subjects who borrow o are also able to take more than one
e in any given attempt. The reason for this is that they are effectively using the units of the
lender in the attack. Therefore, any successful attack counts as a successful attack for each
participating member and takes one unit for every member that contributes to the pool of
offensive units, conditional that the target has that many units to take. Otherwise, the successful
attack will remove all the units of the target. For instance, if the three subjects lend a person
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their units, then this person will now take four units rather than one any time she or he is
successful.
If a subject attempts to plunder another subject within their own group, however, then
neither subject commands the pooled resources d or o of the group. It is as if they are attacking
outside the apparatus of the group.9
We also allow subjects to send e to other subjects. They may perform this by entering the
desired amount of e and the intended subject of these units into a text box and then clicking send.
If subjects voluntarily send units using this mechanism, then they permanently reside with the
recipient (at least until the recipient is plundered or voluntarily sends units out themselves).
Subjects are able to communicate using both a public and a private chat room. All
subjects in the experiment can read messages sent to the public chat room, which is visible to all
subjects throughout the experiment. Groups have the additional ability to communicate through
a private chat room that is only visible to subjects within the particular group. We allow this
private communication to allow groups to more easily facilitate cooperation within a mostly
conflictual environment. Previous experimental research shows that communication can indeed
increase the likelihood of cooperation (see Ostrom et. al. 1992). The subject is able to observe
successful and unsuccessful takes by her and others. We display the amount of time passed in
the session, earnings per second, and total earnings and update every second. In addition, the
subject can see how many defensive units and offensive units that her group controls at all times.
Figure 1 displays a sample screen shot for this treatment.

B. Baseline Treatment
As a baseline to the Nozick treatment, we also conducted a treatment that did not allow
subjects to form groups, which we label the Hobbes treatment. Subjects in this treatment are not
able to form groups and thus do not have any of the additional abilities that go along with group
formation, including the ability to lend offensive units, pool defensive units, or communicate
through a private chat room.

9

See Noh’s discussion of the need to reduce intra-agency private enforcement of rights (p. 15).

8

Figure 1. Screenshot for Nozick Treatment

C. Procedures
We conducted six sessions in each of the two treatments, for which we recruited 72
subjects from the at-large undergraduate population at George Mason University. We seated
subjects at a visually isolated computer terminal where they interacted anonymously with other
participants. Sessions lasted 40 minutes after approximately 15 minutes of instructions. We
recruited subjects for an experiment that could last up to 90 minutes, but we left the actual
experimental interaction time undisclosed to mitigate end-game effects of a necessarily finite
experiment. Subjects received instructions about how to participate in the experiment (see
Appendix 1) followed by a quiz of 10 questions. Each session had six participants who only
participated in a single session of this experiment. Subjects received $7 for showing up on time
in addition to what they earned in the experiment. The average earnings without the show-up
payment were $14.50. We paid out earnings privately at the conclusion of the experiment.

IV. Hypotheses on Anarchy
In designing our experiment to examine the circumstances envisioned by Nozick, we
utilize, relative to a canonical economic experiment, a rather open-ended framework to grant our

9
subjects the flexibility to create their own social order based upon their repeated interactions with
one another. We knowingly trade off the pinpoint predictions of a static Nash equilibrium for
the even tougher challenge of forming a stable social order in a continuous time anarchical
environment bereft of external enforcement. Nevertheless, the replicable conditions of our
precisely specified environment generate several hypotheses inspired by Nozick’s thesis. First,
we hypothesize that the Nozick treatment will be more efficient on average than the Hobbes
treatment. We determine efficiency by the ratio of units placed into e relative to the total number
of units available. Following the terminology in Skaperdas (1992), we define “full cooperation”
as occurring when all available units in the economy are placed in e. More formally, efficiency
6

at time τ is defined as Eτ =

∑e τ
k =1
6

k

∑x
k =1

6

, where

∑x
k =1

k

is always 144.10 The “average efficiency” in a

k

2400

session (of 2400 periods) is

∑ Eτ

τ =1

2400

. Nozick’s claim that protective associations lead to a social

order serves as the foundation for this hypothesis.
Naturally, every experimental “test” of a theory is a joint test of the theory and the
applied context in which the theory is implemented (Smith 2002, 2008). If we observe that our
economies in this first laboratory experiment regularly deviate from Nozick’s philosophical
argument, then only with more observations under a wide variety of environmental and
institutional conditions will it become possible to deduce with more confidence whether these
systematic deviations are due to an auxiliary hypothesis on how an experiment is implemented,
or due to the circumstance that the foundations of Nozick’s argument do not comport with the
facts of human sociality. In either case, we have generated a set of facts against which to
examine further conjectures.
Second, we hypothesize that a single group will emerge in the Nozick treatment that will
eventually include all active members. According to Nozick, a monopoly on force can emerge in
the market for protection without the help of artificial entry barriers, as this market is both
relative and violent.

In other words, the value of a protective association is determined

according to its relative abilities compared with competing associations. Furthermore, this
10

A total of 1 unit in each of two Nozick sessions was lost in the ether when a subject transferred multiple units. As
0.7% of the total number of units, we do not consider this to be a consequential software glitch.
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competition is violent, so joining the association with an absolute advantage in violence is
pertinent for the rational consumer. Simply stated, “customers will not stably settle for the lesser
good and competing companies are caught in a declining spiral” (p. 17). Nozick conjectures that
as one group becomes relatively more powerful than its rivals, its members will either terminate
the remaining individuals11 or find it beneficial to provide protective services to the unaffiliated
members to reduce the risk of conflict.
Third, we hypothesize that the ability to communicate in real time allows subjects to
coordinate better on cooperative strategies and settle their conflicts, resulting in higher efficiency
in our Hobbes treatment relative to the observations in Powell & Wilson. As mentioned above,
Ostrom & Walker (1992) find that allowing subjects to communicate can lead to a pronounced
change in rates of cooperation. The other difference between our Hobbes treatment and Powell
& Wilson is that we allow subjects to transfer units voluntarily. We incorporated this feature
into our baseline treatment primarily to further limit the differences between treatments in our
comparative analysis. We also added this feature in recognition of Buchanan’s argument that
“[t]o secure an initial agreement on positive claims to goods or to resource endowments, some
transfer of goods or endowments may be required. That is to say, some ‘redistribution’ of goods
or endowments may have to take place before a sufficiently acceptable base for property claims
can be established” (Buchanan 1975, p. 83). Though it would seem that the addition of these two
features reduces the comparability to Powell & Wilson, we do find the results of our Hobbes
treatment closely approximate theirs with a few exceptions noted below.

V. Results: Anarchy, State, or Utopia?
In reporting our results, we first formally test our hypotheses regarding Nozick and
Hobbes treatments. To convey a deeper level of the rich interactions in these societies, we next
summarize our twelve Nozick and Hobbes sessions using evidence from chat transcripts, along
with general observations about each session. Each session description also includes a chart that
displays the allocation of units between the three uses at each second of the session. The charts
for the Nozick sessions contain a line plot of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration

11

Following Powell & Wilson (2008), we define “termination” as occurring when a subject has 3 or less units of x.
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for each moment of the session.12 This quantifies the extent to which a single protective
association emerges in the session. Finally, we offer qualitative remarks to organize the general
patterns that we observe.

A. Testing Our Hypotheses
Efficiency
In assessing our hypotheses, we find several surprising results. In terms of efficiency, the
Nozick sessions displayed uniformly low levels of cooperation with only one session (N6)
achieving efficiency greater than 50%. The Hobbes sessions on the other hand were either
highly efficient (H1, H2) or dismally inefficient (H3, H4, H5, and H6). Table 1 reports the
efficiency levels of the six Nozick sessions along with the Hobbes sessions.13

Using a

nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average
efficiency of the Nozick and Hobbes sessions are equally efficient (W6,6 = 20, p-value = 0.5909,
one-sided test).
Table 1. Average Efficiency
Session
Nozick
Hobbes
1
22.7%
60.6%
2
34.4%
88.2%
3
17.6%
11.6%
4
26.7%
14.7%
5
13.3%
13.7%
6
51.4%
21.8%
27.7%
35.1%
Average

The two Nozick sessions in which full cooperation arose (N2 and N6) led to moderate
levels of efficiency but the remaining four were low. Subjects in both sessions H1 and H2 were
able to attain full cooperation very early in their respective sessions. Because the life of a
laboratory economy is necessarily finite, unlike the naturally occurring world in which time
marches on, a frequently raised question is whether the subjects just need more time to “learn,”
so they can conform to the outcome predicted by our hypothesis concerning the higher

12

We calculate the HHI as the sum of squares of the percentage share of units under the control of each group at
any moment of time. Subjects who were not part of a group were counted as a group of one. Thus, the HHI at the
start of each session contains six shares.
13
The relative comparison between Nozick and Hobbes does not change significantly when average efficiency of the
sessions is broken down into halves or thirds.

12
efficiencies of the Nozickian societies. If this is so, then why did sessions N2 and N6 not need
more time to reach 100% efficiency? And why did sessions H1 and H2 need such little time?
Apparently, our experiment is sufficiently long enough to generate a variety of outcomes, which
is exactly what we need to help us to understand what factors account for better or worse
performance in these economies.

Group Formation
In terms of group formation, the Nozick sessions were marked both by cooperative and
conflictual tendencies. Contra the invisible hand process proposed by Nozick, we do not observe
an inevitable tendency for the subjects to form a single group. This was most strikingly evident
in session N3. Not only did the single group break back down into several subgroups, but also
there was no change in the amount of plundering before or after the overarching group formed.
Moreover, Sessions N2 and N4 developed a relatively stable equilibrium of two distinct groups
for most of their respective sessions.

Our Hobbes Treatment vs. Powell & Wilson
Contrary to our hypothesis, we find no evidence that the ability to communicate in real
time allows our subjects to coordinate better and settle their conflicts relative to the similar, but
communication-free exercise in Powell & Wilson (2008). Comparing our 6 sessions with their 8
sessions, one of our sessions is the most efficient at 88.2%, and another is the most inefficient at
11.6%. Not surprisingly then, we fail to reject using a Wilcoxon test the null hypothesis that the
average efficiency of the two experiments are equally efficient (W8,6 = 31.5, p-value = 0.8375,
one-sided test). Succinctly summarized, communication is not a sufficient solution to this
particular problem.

B. Summary of Nozick Sessions
Session N1
Very few groups formed in N1. There were numerous attempts to start groups by a few
of the subjects but almost all of these invitations were rejected. The group formation that
occurred was sporadic and short-lived, and no group formed until after the experiment was past
the two-thirds mark.
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The average efficiency was also very low in this session (22.7%) due to constant
plundering, and two subjects were terminated. An interesting development occurred towards the
end of the session with at least three of the active subjects proposing a truce. One subject said,
“hey guys listen i got a way to increase our earnings. lets all place our units in earn and let it
increase per sec. no one attack each other.” Two of the other subjects seemed receptive to this,
but the session ended shortly after these comments. It was not apparent at that time that they had
reached an agreement.

Session N2
Two groups emerged almost immediately in this session. Both groups pooled their
offensive capabilities, and in each group, one of the subjects took the lead in offering advice on
how to utilize this feature of the experimental interface. About one-third of the way into the
session, two groups had emerged with three members each.
One group focused, though not exclusively, on increasing their units of defense and held
the rest of their assets in earnings, while the other group put nearly all of their units into either
offense or defense at any one time. Eventually, one subject had the idea of a truce by stating in
the group’s private chat room, “everyone SHOULD just stop attacking and earn.” This led the
group to further decrease their offensive units but resulted in no parallel behavior by the other
group. Later the same subject wrote a message in the public chat room that said, “there needs to
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be an agreement between everyone. see no one is making money right now.” A subject from the
other group then responded in the public chat room, “should we all agree not to attack.”
The two subjects who had communicated a truce in the public chat room then went back
into their respective group chat rooms and prompted their group members to put all units into
earnings. One of the subjects asked for a signal of trust from the other group by asking them to
“take your units out of offense so i can trust you.” There was still some hesitation as each
subject began to pool more and more units into earnings. One of the groups even suggested a
trigger strategy in case the other group defected. However, all subjects eventually put all units in
earnings and abided by the agreement.

Session N3
Group membership in this session was erratic with members accepting invitations but
then leaving the group soon after. As a result, groups were not very stable. It appeared that
subjects did not develop a sufficient level of trust within groups as there was very little offensive
pooling. At the same time, the number of attacks was quite large, and the average efficiency
suffered as a result (17.6%). There was no indication of any interest of a truce. No clear leaders
emerged among the subjects to instigate such an outcome or even to coordinate attacks. One
person was terminated.
It is interesting that the majority of the chatting took place in the public chat room versus
private group chat rooms. An especially interesting development occurred when all six subjects
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were part of the same group just over halfway through the session. Yet this led to no observable
decrease in plundering! The group eventually dissolved. There was no attempt at cooperation at
this time or any other in this session.

Session N4
Two groups formed about a third of the way through this session. These two groups
contained two members each until about halfway through the session. At this time, both groups
invited one of the remaining two members. The two groups did not coordinate their attacks in
any systematic way. Pooling occurred occasionally but was sporadic, as the groups never came
to an agreement on who would attack and how they would distribute the plundered units.
Attacking was mostly uniform across the session though efficiency did improve towards the end
of the experiment.
Efficiency was relatively low in this session (26.7%), and one person was terminated. By
the end of the session, four of the five active subjects were in one group, which may have been
why efficiency started to rise towards the end of the session. There were no explicit attempts to
cooperate, however.
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Session N5
This session had a similar pattern of group development to Session N4. For about half of
the session there were two groups with two members each. There were no explicit attempts to
pool offensive resources within the groups. Eventually, one of the groups acquired another
member and finally a fifth member. The remaining sixth subject never joined the group. By the
end of the session, this remaining subject was attempting to plunder but was unable to get
through the defenses of the five combined subjects. The large group pooled more of their units
into earnings as the session reached its conclusion. However, overall efficiency was quite low
(13.3%) due to the earlier plundering. Like the two previous sessions, there was no attempt to
communicate a truce among the subjects.
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Session N6
This session started like much of the others with two groups forming. One of the groups
was especially well coordinated and quickly pooled their offensive capabilities. This led to a
significant amount of plundering from the other group. Halfway through the session, a “leader”
in this group proposed a truce by inviting the others to join their group. This led two of the
remaining three members to join what one subject termed their “alliance.” Eventually, the
remaining subject joined as well.
From the halfway mark on, efficiency steadily climbed. By the end of the session, all
available units were in earnings. Note that this session and Session N2 are the only Nozick
sessions where full cooperation emerged.

C. Summary of Hobbes Sessions
Session H1
The first posted message in this session was “no one is earning money.”

Shortly

thereafter, another subject proposed an agreement to stop predation by offering, “how about we
all put ours in earn and not take from each other so at least we earn something,” which the
subjects discussed and agreed to.

At one point during this discussion, a subject tried

unsuccessfully to take from another subject, but this was the last attempt at predation in the
session. The subjects agreed not to take from each other with one subject offering, “and if
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someone gets greedy everyone else will just steal from them.”

The subjects reached full

cooperation shortly after the halfway mark in this session.

Session H2
Predation was largely absent in this session relative to the others. In fact, only 23
attempts to plunder occurred in this session. This is due perhaps to one subject’s proposal for an
agreement to stop conflict very early in this session. The same subject also proposed the strategy
of taking units away from anyone who continued to hold units in offense. The proposal did not
work, however, and the subjects continued to attack each other. Several began to recognize,
however, that they could do better if they all refrained. For example, one subject said, “we can
allmake a lotmore if you stop [attacking].”
After testing several parameters of the experimental environment, several subjects
attempted to persuade others to invest fully in earnings. One subject was concerned that the
subject who organized the agreement was making more than everyone else, saying, “this was
your idea i want to know how much you are making” because “it wouldnt be fair if you have
more then everybody.” The “leader” of the effort to cooperate replied, “i'm making .0216.” At
this point a third subject came to the defense of the leader by saying that “if he is [making more
money] its becuase he got more questions right,” in reference to the way initial earnings were
allocated. They continued to discuss the fairness of the distribution of earnings and whether
subjects should return units they had previously taken .
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Full efficiency was reached less than a third of the way through the session. This
efficiency was interrupted only once during the remainder of the session when one subject broke
the agreement by successfully taking from another subject. The plundered subject immediately
responded by taking a unit back. There were no more takings for the remainder of the session.
The subjects in this session were very concerned about distributive issues. There were
several proposals for ways to improve the distribution, but some noted the difficulty in
determining who owed compensation to whom, because everyone had stolen from everyone.
One subject suggested that everyone should have an equal amount.

Another subject told

everyone to “give back whatever you stole.” The subjects agreed to this last strategy and began
transferring units to compensate for previous takings for the remainder of the session.

Session H3
The most notable feature of this session was the lack of chat. The first message did not
appear until the second half of the session, when one subject asked, “Subject 2 can you send
some units to 6.” Following this request, subjects posted several similar messages prompting
subjects to redistribute units voluntarily. For example, one subject told another to “give some to
Subject 4 dont be greed…he or she needs it.” Towards the end of the session, a subject proposed
that they all “put everythng in earnings.” Nevertheless, plunder continued until the end of the
session. Efficiency was persistently low and never went past the 50% mark once the session
began.
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Session H4
After several minutes, the participants began chatting, and one subject was terminated
early. One subject proposed, “want to make a pact whereever ones puts there stuff in earnings
and doesnt take from anyone and just collect mmoney?” There was some discussion about a
possible agreement, and several subjects said they would comply. However, one subject held out
and did not respond even when directly addressed by the other subjects. The subject rarely
engaged in conversation.

When he did, it was unclear what he meant.

For example, he

interjected “game over” in the midst of a discussion regarding cooperating. Perhaps the holdout
thought that if all subjects begin to cooperate, the experimenter would end the session arbitrarily
or perhaps that refraining from dialogue would increase his bargaining power (See, for instance,
Schelling 1960).
After the halfway mark, the subjects discussed making an agreement without the holdout.
They come close to agreeing on a contract, but it is unclear if they ever really made one. For
instance, one subject complained that they could not make money if the holdout continued to
take from them. In the remainder of the experiment, the subjects pleaded with the holdout, who
remained silent. This session was particularly interesting because all subjects clearly desired
agreement except for one, yet this one subject’s refusal to commit to an agreement was an
effective obstacle to implementing it.
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Session H5
Communication began early in this session, as a subject proposed cooperation by asking,
“What would happen if we all just put everything in earnings.” Later another subject explicitly
proposed a cooperative agreement by asking, “does everyone want to try setting a defense for all
of us and depositing all our offense in earning and not attacking.” The others did not agree and
continued to take from each other. The initial instigator for cooperation raised the idea again
saying, “I vote we put it 100% in earnings” and “Can we agree on dumping all our points into
earnings?” Four of the subjects agreed but attempts at plundering continued throughout the
session. One of the two subjects who did not agree to the cooperative agreement did not send
any messages during the entire session.

Session H6
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The subjects did not communicate in this session until after the halfway mark. Soon after
they did, they began to discuss a cooperative agreement.

The establishment of such an

agreement never took place, however, and the session was particularly nasty, brutish and short.
Three subjects were terminated. Two of these subjects were “resurrected” later in the session by
transferred units from one of the remaining subjects, for which he received the praise, “bravo
person 5.”

Discussion
In interpreting our results, we draw upon Miller (1992). The similarity between his work
and our own is the common attempt to address issues of conflict within an environment where
incentives may lead individuals to act against the interests of the collective unit. Miller posits
three general features that may solve social discord: leadership, the creation of cooperative
norms, and binding institutional provisions to maintain cooperation (p. 233).
These general insights are helpful in determining why some sessions led to such dismal
levels of efficiency while others were able to achieve full cooperation. Each session that
achieved full cooperation had particular subjects who constantly appealed to their fellow subjects
to cease plundering. Most of the sessions that did not reach full cooperation had no such
leadership in guiding the group to the cooperative outcome. In session N1, for example, subject
3 emerged as a leader in focusing the group on a more cooperative outcome. Unfortunately, his
comments came at the end of the session and the group did not act on them in time to increase
overall efficiency. In session N2, subject 6 was the most vocal in coaxing both members of his
own group and the other group to cease attacking and to put all of their units into earnings, and
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he was eventually successful in this endeavor. Subject 1 in session N6 impelled his fellow
subjects to cease attacking, and hence the session was able to reach full cooperation more
quickly than any other Nozick session. The result was that this was the most efficient session in
the treatment.
Sessions N3, N4, and N5 were notable for their lack of leadership to achieve cooperation.
There was no message that mentioned either the nature of the dilemma that the subjects faced or
what actions would be necessary to attain full cooperation. This result is especially surprising
when we take the Hobbes sessions into account. All six Hobbes sessions had at least one subject
mention the dilemma and the cooperative strategy of putting all units into earnings. Only half of
the Nozick sessions, however, explicitly expressed this mind-set. This leads us to the conjecture
that the group formation mechanism in our experimental environment obfuscates the social
problem to be solved by activating the evolutionarily deep “us-versus-them” mentality of tribes.
In another paper with free-form communication among its participants, Kimbrough,
Smith, and Wilson (2008) investigate how impersonal distal exchange may grow out of local
personal exchange in an economy with three geographically separated communities each
connected to a local meeting area. To quantify how personal or impersonal their participants’
exchanges are, they conduct a word count on the first-person plural pronoun “we” in the local
and distal chat rooms. They argue that the word “we” reveals a personal connection between its
user to another person or persons, and indeed find overwhelmingly that subjects use “we” more
often in the local personal community.
In conducting a word count on our own transcripts, we find two results of interest.
Because our participants all reside in the same visible area, “we” and “us” in the Nozick
treatment could be inclusive of the small subgroup or the whole group of 6 participants in a way
that the context of the discussion could not discriminate. However, the third personal plural
pronouns “they” and “them” connote “others” or rival outsiders. These outsiders can be easily
demarcated by color and private conversation in the Nozick treatment but not so in the Hobbes
treatment. To test the conjecture that the Nozick treatment actuates an “us-versus-them” mindset
in a way that the Hobbes treatment does not, we count the number of times “they” and “them”
appear in the transcripts as well as how many times “we” and “us” appear. We conjecture that
“they” and “them” will appear more often in the transcripts of the Nozick treatment than in the
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Hobbes treatment, but that there would be no difference in the use of “we” and “us.” Table 2
reports the raw counts of these words.

Table 2. Word Counts by Session
Session
We/Us
They/Them
N1
2
1
N2
40
16
N3
7
1
N4
17
21
N5
18
5
N6
74
17
Average
26.3
10.2
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
Average

13
39
1
26
12
3
15.7

4
4
0
2
1
0
1.8

As conjectured, we find that the subjects use “they” and “them” statistically more often in
the Nozick treatment than in the Hobbes treatment (W6,6 = 29, p-value = 0.0465, one-sided test),
and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal usage of “we” and “us” across treatments (W6,6
= 23, p-value = 0.4848, two-sided test).
The third feature, binding institutions, has less relevance within the parameters of our
experiment, as subjects were unable to commit to any sort of binding agreement given the lack of
external enforcement. However, in several sessions, subjects communicated “rules” that would
govern subsequent behavior once full cooperation had been achieved. For example, in Session
H2 a subject was reluctant in putting all of their units into earnings so they retained some units in
defense. This led another subject, who was the leader in focusing the subjects on the cooperative
outcome, to proclaim “person 1, please take down your defense” followed by another subject to
remark “you dont wanna be against everyone else.” The offending subject eventually acquiesced
and put all of their units into earnings. In this case and in other sessions, it was apparent that the
explicit threat of punishment created a provision militating against conflict. This was easier to
accomplish once subjects placed the vast majority of units in earnings.

To illustrate the
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significance of this point, neither session that achieved higher than 90% efficiency after the first
100 periods never subsequently fell below this mark.

VI.

Conclusion
Contrary to the Nozick hypothesis, we find that allowing subjects to form groups does

not ameliorate conflict. If anything, it hinders the development of a collective regard for solving
the dilemma by encouraging in- and out-group attitudes. The implication of these observations
is that the ability to form private protective associations does not alone foster the necessary
social cohesion to blunt plunder and eliminate costly expenditures on the defense against
plunder.

Sociality appears to be the key for a group to recognize the dilemma, and the

emergence of a leader from within the group serves the vital role of encouraging participants to
establish their own rules of order. As Hume (1740) appositely notes, “It is only a general sense
of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and
which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules” (pp. 314-5).
It is deeply embedded in human nature for individuals to form tribal groups, yet such
social formations may lead to both cooperation and conflict (Ridley 1997). To ameliorate the
threat of conflict, it may be prudent to move individuals beyond factions by focusing attention on
the consequences of conflict and the rewards of cooperation. Our experiments demonstrates that
such endeavors appear to succeed where a general sense of common interest, leadership, and
provisions against backslide are present.
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Appendix: Experiment Instructions
Welcome
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Your earnings, which will be paid
to you in CASH at the end of the experiment, will be determined partly by your decisions and
partly by the decisions of others. If you have questions at any time while reading the
instructions, please raise your hand and a lab monitor will assist you.
Each person is endowed with units of a fictitious good. The number of units of this fictitious
good you will start this experiment with will be determined by your answers to a set of 10
questions. You will then be ranked depending on how many questions you answered correctly.
Ties will be decided by giving a higher ranking to the person who finishes the quiz in the shortest
amount of time. The higher your ranking, the more units you will start with.
Your initial endowment will be placed in your earnings. The number of units designated for
earning is displayed in green under “Earn.” in your box (the one labeled “YOU”). You will earn
$0.00077 per second for EACH unit you designate for this purpose. This is equivalent to
$0.0462 per minute per unit.
Earnings units can also be used to take Earnings units from other people, which we will call
Offensive units (“Off.”). Alternatively, Earnings units can serve as units for defense (“Def.”).
or
buttons in your box (you will not
To move units to either Offense or Defense, click
be able to do this until the experiment starts). It will take 10 seconds for the units to transfer.
You may also transfer units back to Earnings in the same manner.
Notice that the other players in the game have a
(take) button next to their box. If you
have designated some number of units for offense, then you can attempt to take a unit from
another player. If you take a unit from someone else, it will be added to your Earnings units and
taken away from their Earnings units. Once you attempt to take a unit, you will not be able to
attempt again for a period of 20 seconds. Also, when you attempt to take a unit, a line will
appear between your house and your targets. The line will slowly fade as time passes. Note that
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there are several other colored lines that will indicate certain functions throughout the
experiment. A key for these can be found in the top right- and left-hand corners of the screen.
An attempt to take units from another person will be successful depending on how many units
the taker has designated for Offense relative to how many units the target has designated for
Defense.
Specifically, the probability that the taker is successful is:
Success rate of taker = (Units of Offense) ÷ (Units of Offense + Units of Defense)
For example, if you have 1 unit of Offense and the target has 1 unit of Defense, the probability
that the attempt will be successful is 1 ÷ (1 + 1) or 50%.
If the target has 2 units of Defense, then the probability that the attempt will be successful is 1 ÷
(1 + 2) or 33%.
If the target has no units of Defense, then the attempt will be successful 100% of the time.
You may communicate with others in the chat frame once the experiment starts. To send
messages, type in the small box next to the send button and press the enter key or the send
button. Your text will appear in the textbox above. You are free to discuss all aspects of the
experiment, with the following exceptions: you may not reveal your name, discuss side
payments, make threats, or engage in inappropriate language (including such shorthand as
‘WTF’). If you do, you will be excused and you will forfeit your earnings.
[Begin Nozick treatment only instructions]
Individuals can pool together units in a group. To start a group, use the Start Group button at the
bottom right corner of your screen. The background color of your box will change to denote
your group. To invite people to join your group, use the
(invite) button next to their box.
Everyone in your group will pool their defense. This means that if there are 3 people in your
group and each person has 5 units put towards defense, each person in your group will have a
defense of 15.
Everyone in your group will also have the option to pool offense. To pool your offense with
(transfer control) button above their box. This will transfer
another person click the
control of the units you have designated for offense to that person. That means that if you have 5
units for offense and the person you have transferred control to has 6 units then the combined
offense will be 11 and that person may then attempt to take from another person. If they are
successful the person you have transferred control will receive one unit for each person
(including themselves) that has transferred control to them. You may retract your offensive units
at anytime by clicking transfer control button again.
You may chat with anyone in your group using the “Group chat” frame at the bottom of your
screen. Only people currently in your group will be able to view and send messages in it.
[End Nozick treatment only instructions]
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A summary of your earnings along with your current rate of earnings per second and the time
elapsed in the experiment can be found in the “Summary” frame at the bottom right corner of
your screen.
The sum of your earnings will be paid to you privately at the end of the experiment. You will
not be told how long the experiment will last.
This is the end of the instructions. If you have any questions please raise your hand and a
monitor will come by to answer them. If you are finished with the instructions please press Start.
The instructions will remain on your screen until the experiment starts.
A summary of the information is displayed at the bottom of your screen. You will not be told
how long the experiment will last. This is the end of the instructions. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand and a monitor will come by to answer them. The experiment will begin
when everyone has finished reading the instructions.
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